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A FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION: AN ARGUMENT
FOR THE CLOSING OF THE NYSE FLOOR
Gerald T. Nowak*
The world is moving so fast these days that the
man who says it can't be done is generally
interrupted by someone doing it.'
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is an anachronism.
Formed in the early years of the industrial revolution,2 the
NYSE is the archetype of the U.S. system of stock exchanges,
indeed, the model for' stock exchanges the world over.
Nonetheless, it is an idea whose time has come and gone. This
Note does not advocate eliminating the exchange of stock.
Instead, this Note offers a much more "modest proposal."3 This
Note proposes the elimination of the least efficient' link in the
communication process between buyers and sellers of stock and
derivative financial instruments-the physical exchanges-in
favor of a completely automated communication and exchange
process.
* B.A. 1986, Michigan State University; M.B.A. 1990, Auburn University; J.D.
expected 1993, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank Professor Joel
Seligman of the University of Michigan Law School and John F. O'Donovan of the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange for their insight.
1. Elbert Hubbard, quoted in THE CONCISE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS
211 (Robert Andrews ed., 1987).
2. The precursor to the NYSE was formed on May 17, 1792 pursuant to the so-
called "Buttonwood Agreement," which created a cartel among stock brokers of the time.
NYSE, FACT BOOK 1992, 81 (1993) [hereinafter FACT BOOK 1992]; see also ROBERT
SOBEL, THE CURBSTONE BROKERS 9-10 (1970).
3. Cf Milton H. Cohen, The National Market System-A Modest Proposal, 46 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 743 (1978) (emphasizing the need for gradual development of a national
market system).
4. "Efficient" and "efficiency" are used throughout this Note in an economic sense,
that is, efficient in the use of resources. 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 84 (2d ed.
1989) ("Economic efficiency relates to output per unit cost of the resources employed;
contrasted with technical efficiency, which means output of energy per unit of energy
applied."). The words have a second meaning relating to a market's ability to discover
information and to reflect that information in the price of a commodity. This is the
basis of the "efficient capital market hypothesis." See generally Ronald J. Gilson &
Rinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
For a contrary view of market efficiency, see generally Lynn A. Stout, The
Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and
Secu,-ities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 613 (1988).
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The exchange of stock is a process of communication.5 In
days gone by, the entire process-from the investor,6 to the
broker, all the way to the floor of the stock exchange---occurred
manually. The fate of all transactions in stock lay, quite
literally, in scraps of paper and in face-to-face communication.7
Gradually, most of the links in the communication chain have
been automated, with varying degrees of success.8 The only
significant manual link left in the chain is the transaction on
the floor of the stock exchange itself.
The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has argued for a
more fully automated system, in the form of a "National Market
System."9 This idea was part of an effort to modernize the
exchange of securities l" ordered by Congress in 1975 when it
amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to include section
11A." The idea failed to come to fruition,12 at least in part
because it was thought that the technology was not available to
create such a system.'3 Such considerations may no longer
5. The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has described a central market
system as "a system of communications by which the various elements of the
marketplace, be they exchanges or over-the-counter markets, are tied together." Future
Structure of Securities Markets, 37 Fed. Reg. 5286, 5287 (1972).
6. This Note will use the term "investor" as shorthand for buyers or sellers of
equity securities or their derivative instruments.
7. See infra Part I.A.
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See Request For Comment on Issues Relating to the Development of Order
Routing and Market Linkage Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 14,885, [1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81,625 (June 23, 1978); Development of a
National Market System, Exchange Act Release No. 14,416, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,502 (Jan. 26, 1978).
10. See INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT OF THE SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N,
H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. xxv (1971); see also Donald E. Farrar, The
Coming Reform on Wall Street, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1972, at 108 (discussing
the SEC's push for a 'centralized, competitive, electronically linked marketplace").
11. Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 110 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78k-l(a)(2) (1988)). This amendment was intended to 'facilitate the establishment of
a national system." 15 U.S.C. § 78q-l(a). The SEC was given broad powers to
accomplish this goal. Bradford Nat'l Clearing Corp. v. SEC, 590 F.2d 1085, 1091 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
12. The SEC, however, recently has embarked on an ambitious study of the future
of market structure, the Equity Market 2000 study. Request For Comment on U.S.
Equity Market Structure Study, Exchange Act Release No. 30,920, [1992 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,012 (July 14, 1992); see also Roberta S. Karmel,
The Market 2000 Study, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 15, 1992, at 3.
13. It is not clear, however, whether such a system was technically difficult even
when first proposed. As long ago as July 1, 1976, the NYSE claimed a 'message switch
is by no means a new computer application." NYSE, A NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM 59
(1976). In April 1978, the NYSE told the SEC that it could develop a universal switch
within three to six months. See Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, 5 SECURITIES
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exist. The emergence of digital fiber-optic communication 14 and
of the supercomputer 5 makes the creation of a national
automated securities exchange system a much easier task.
Even former officials of the New York Stock Exchange agree
that complete automation is inevitable. 6
Technical considerations notwithstanding, the brokers and
specialists on the exchange floors argue that the human
element is vital to maintain an orderly and efficient market.'
7
There is nothing, however, inherent in the nature of the
communication process on the floor that requires a human
touch. This Note argues that brokers and specialists are an
anachronism and that any legitimate function they perform can
be performed over the computer network.
In support of this proposition, Part I of this Note describes
and analyzes the stock exchange communication process as it
has existed in the past and as it currently exists, paying
particular attention to the role of the floor broker and the stock
specialist.'" Part II examines certain alternatives, evaluating
such systems as to their potential as a replacement for the
physical exchanges. Part III suggests an SEC rule granting
specific exemption from exchange reporting requirements to
low-volume automated systems in the hope of spurring
innovation in the business of trading securities.
REGULATION 2506 n.70 (1990) (citing Letter from NYSE to Mr. George Fitzsimmons
15-19 (Apr. 17, 1978) (on file with the SEC, File No. 57-735a)).
14. See generally Lee May, High-Speed Computer Networks Urged as Boon to
Business, Schools, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1991, at A5 (discussing recent congressional
approval of a $1 billion, five-year project to develop a digital fiber-optic
"supercomputing" network). Of course, fiber-optic lines are not infallible. See Severed
Phone Lines Halt Some N.Y. Trading, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1991, at D2 (tracing
disruptions in trading to problems with fiber-optic cable).
15. See Don Clark, Intel Rolls Out New Supercomputer Today, S.F. CHRON.,
Nov. 18, 1991, at B2 (announcing the unveiling of a contender for the world's fastest
computer).
16. See Robert J. McCartney, Big Board, Big Birthday, Big Questions; NYSE Marks
200 Years, But Faces Cloudy Future, WASH. POST, May 19, 1992, at C1.
Sometime within the lifetime of the NYSE's own top officials, analysts say, the
Big Board is likely to dispense with the trading floor altogether and replace it
with a vast network of computers .... "I don't know if it'll be 10 years [from now],
but, at some point in time in the future, that's what will happen," said William
Freund, who was the NYSE's chief economist from 1968 to 1985 and now is
chairman of the economics department at Pace University's business school. "The
competition will drive the exchange in that direction," he said.
Id.
17. Saul Hansell, The Wild, Wired World of Electronic Exchanges, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Sept. 1989, at 91, 92-94.
18. See infra Part I.C.
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I. THE CURRENT SYSTEM
All professions are conspiracies against the laity.'9
Equity securities, that is, corporate stocks and their
derivative instruments,20 currently are traded in a variety of
ways. Stocks are either traded on the floors of the seven stock
exchanges registered with the SEC,2 on the "over the counter"
(OTC) market,22 or on one of several "proprietary" trading
systems.23 The most popular of the derivative instruments, the
19. George Bernard Shaw, quoted in OxFORD DIcTioNARY OF QUOTATIONS 496 (3d.
ed. 1979).
20. There are three major types of financial instruments which derive their value
from equity securities: stock index futures, options, and stock index options. A future
is a contractual obligation to buy or sell a certain commodity, in this case an equity
security, at a future date for a specified price. An option is similar, except that its
exercise is at the "option" of the holder, that is, it may go unexercised, while a future
is a binding contract on both sides. A stock index future is a future which is based on
the price of a market basket of securities, or "stock index," rather than the price of a
single security. The obligation incurred is to pay, in cash, the difference in price
between the contracted price and the actual price of the stock index as of the future
date, rather than deliver the basket of securities itself. A stock option is simply an
option to buy a particular stock at a particular price. Finally, a stock-index option is
the option, but not the obligation, to participate in the movement of a stock index. For
a description of these instruments, see generally Lewis D. Solomon & Howard B.
Dicker, The Crash of 1987: A Legal and Public Policy Analysis, 57 FORDHAM L REV.
191 (1988).
21. Exchanges register with the SEC under the provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78(f). The seven exchanges currently registered
are (in order of stock dollar volume) the New York, the American (also in New York),
the Midwest (in Chicago), the Pacific (in Los Angeles and San Francisco), the
Cincinnati, the Philadelphia, and the Boston. 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at
2510-12. "The Chicago Board Options Exchange has the authority to trade stocks, but
has not yet done so." Request for Comment on U.S. Equity Market Structure Study,
Exchange Act Release No. 30,920, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 85,012, at 82,910 n.14 (July 14, 1992).
22. This trading is accomplished primarily through the National Association of
Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) system. The 'NASDAQ system,
which began operations in 1971, is now one of the largest stock markets in the world,
with trading valued at $694 billion in 1991." Request For Comment on U.S. Equity
Market Structure Study, Exchange Act Release No. 30,920, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,012, at 82,907 (July 14, 1992).
23. "Proprietary" or "third market' trading systems such as Instinet and POSIT
are automated systems which match buyers and sellers of securities at the then-current
price on the exchange on which the security is listed. See Proprietary Trading Systems,
Exchange Act Release No. 26,708, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)-
84,406 (Apr. 11, 1989) (describing in detail the proprietary trading systems of the
United States); see also Request for Comment on U.S. Equity Market Structure Study,,
488
Closing the NYSE Floor
future on the Standard & Poor's 500 index, is traded on the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME).' Of all these trading
methodologies, the one which occupies the central role, both in
terms of volume and price discovery, is trading stocks on the
floor of the NYSE. Stock indices are keyed to prices on the
NYSE, the other exchanges typically guarantee that they will
meet the prices given on the NYSE, and the volume on the
NYSE dwarfs the volume on all other stock exchanges
combined.25 The NYSE is the "400-pound gorilla" of the
exchanges, and thus will be the target of this Note's assault on
the exchange system itself.
A. The Communication Process, B.C.26
The communication process between one investor and another
used to occur entirely through human contact. An investor
would approach a broker, either in person or on the telephone,
and request that a stock be bought at the market price (a
"market order"). The broker would forward the order, typically
by telephone, to the brokerage firm's trading room near, but not
in, the NYSE. The order then would be transferred to the
firm's booth on the floor of the NYSE. A floor broker would
then pick up the order and physically carry it to the specialist's
post. The floor broker then would execute the trade, either
with another floor broker or with the specialist. This system
would work exactly the same for a "limit order," except that the
floor broker would either carry it to the specialist, who would
either physically record the order in his specialist book for later
Exchange Act Release No. 30,920, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. CCH
1 85,012, at 82,915 (July 14, 1992).
24. "The S&P 500 contract [based on the underlying value of shares in each of the
well-known Standard & Poor's 500 firms] is so popular that, for example, during 1986
its daily dollar volume of transactions was approximately 60 percent greater than the
value of actual stock trading on the New York Stock Exchange." Solomon & Dicker,
supra note 20, at 201 (footnotes omitted).
25. 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 2510-12. For a history of the primacy
of the NYSE, see Walter Werner, Adventure in Social Control of Finance: The National
Market System for Securities, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1233, 1238-41 (1975).
26. Before Computers.
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execution, or hold it before giving it to the specialist."
The process took a minimum of five human contacts to get
the order to the floor and execute it. It would take four" more
contacts to report the results back to the investor. There also
had been four29 human contacts from the seller to the floor, and
four contacts back to the seller. A total of seventeen human
contacts were necessary to execute one trade on the floor of the
NYSE. There also was a similarly labor-intensive process for
the clearance and settlement of these trades off the floor of the
exchange.
Predictably, the labor-intensive nature of this system resulted
in a major breakdown. The "back office crisis" 30 of 1967-70
indicated the inefficiency of a manually operated system.
Volume on the NYSE exploded during that period.31 The
clearance and settlement systems of the major brokerage
houses were simply unable to keep up:
The operational crisis in the securities industry first
reached major dimensions in August of 1967. Newspaper
reports of that period recall the feverish efforts of the Wall
Street community to keep up with each day's business:
Stock certificates and related documents were piled "half-
way-to the ceiling" in some offices; clerical personnel were
working overtime, six and seven days a week, with some
firms using a second or even a third shift to process each
day's transactions. 2
This volume of paperwork resulted in an error rate which
undermined investor confidence in the integrity of the mar-
kets.33 Even as late as July 1969, one of every 8.4 transactions
resulted in a failure to deliver the proper securities on the
27. For a more detailed description of both processes, see 5 Loss & SELIGMAN,
supra note 13, at 2508-09.
28. The same links of the chain, minus the trade itself.
29. Again, eliminating the trade to avoid double counting.
30. 6 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 2897.
31. "The average daily reported volume on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
between 1964 and 1968 grew from 4.89 million shares per average day in 1964 to 12.97
million shares in 1968, reaching a high of 14.9 million share per average day during the
month of December 1968." 6 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 2899.
32. SEC, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF BROKERS AND DEALERS,
H.R. Doc. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 219 (1971).
33. 6 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 2900.
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official settlement day.34 Coupled with a stock market slump in
1969-70, this loss of confidence led to a decline in trading
volume which, paradoxically, caused a precipitous decline in
brokerage firm profitability.35 Some 160 brokerage firms
disappeared from the scene in 1969 and 1970, either going out
of business or merging with other firms.36
The back office crisis, though it has long since subsided,
serves to remind us of two problems with the current stock
exchange system. One is the inherent fallibility of human
interaction. Anyone who has ever played "telephone" would not
be surprised at the error rate involved with so many human
interactions. People make mistakes.3 7 To the extent that we
can eliminate human error in the trading of securities, the
integrity of the system will be that much stronger.38
Second, the back office crisis reminds us that change is
inevitable. If one were to ask a 1965 securities industry back
office worker whether the system was fundamentally flawed,
chances are that the worker would have replied in the negative.
Human nature resists change, particularly when change
eliminates your job. The same was true of the buggy-whip
industry, and the same may be true of the floor broker and
specialist. While one should not ignore their arguments
altogether, one may wish to view the brokers' and specialists'
arguments through the prism of history.39 Virtually all workers
whose jobs have become obsolete have argued that the services
34. Id. (citing Address of Hamer Budge, Sept. 4, 1969 (on file with the SEC)).
35. STAFF OF SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 92D CONG., 1ST SESS., REVIEW OF SEC RECORDS
OF THE DEMISE OF SELECTED BROKER-DEALERS 7 (Subcomm. Print 1971); 6 LOSS &
SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 2902.
36. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SECURITIES
INDUSTRY STUDY, H.R. REP. No. 1519, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1972).
37. Of course, there is room for error in the execution of the manual steps involved
in an automated system as well. Moreover, automated systems carry the potential for
temporary "down time" or total computer failure, or "crashes," which may be a larger
threat to the integrity of the market than any number of small human errors.
38. The dollar cost of correcting errors will also be reduced. In 1983, the average
cost to correct an erroneous price was $75 per trade. NYSE, Filing and Order Granting
Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 19,896, 48
Fed. Reg. 29,642, at 29,643 (1983) (proposed June 20, 1983).
39. See generally Joel Seligman, Future of the National Market System, 10 J. CORP.
L. 79, 81-82 (1984) (noting that certain NYSE rules are outdated, and that major
obstacles to a national market system are mainly political). As Professor James Lorie
noted, the NYSE could not be expected to "take the leadership in the euthanasia of the
floor community." Id. at 82 (footnote omitted).
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they perform are critical, and that the system would come
crashing down if they were eliminated.' Rarely have these
predictions come true.
B. The Communication Process, A.D.4 1
Technology has made, and will continue to make, major
inroads into the trading of securities.42 The exchange of stock
is a dynamic and innovative business. Investors often will
develop new and presumably better trading strategies which
require some flexibility on the part of the exchanges them-
selves.' A ubiquitous example is "index arbitrage." Index
arbitrage is a transaction whereby traders simultaneously
purchase or sell a market basket of securities while taking an
offsetting position in the index futures market (which
represents the expected value of a market basket of securities)
to take advantage of a temporary discrepancy in price."
Automation of the trading markets has been a necessary
40. For instance, William Donaldson, chairman of the NYSE, stated that the "floor
and the information net that [it] provides, and the negotiation that is inherent in the
auction system is a superior system. We don't think a machine can do that for you."
Business World (ABC television broadcast, May 17, 1992). Alternatively, unions have
responded to technology-related job displacement by negotiating for some of the new
work accompanying technological innovations. See generally Aleia G. Rosenberg,
Comment, Automation and the Work Preservation Doctrine: Accommodating
Productivity and Job Security Interests, 32 UCLA L. REV. 135 (1984) (discussing union
proposals to make the replacement of workers with automation a mandatory subject for
collective bargaining under the NLRA).
41. After the Designated Order Turnaround System (DOT).
42. Both the SEC and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
currently have regimes in place to monitor the development and operation of self-
regulatory organizations' automation systems. Automated Systems of Self-Regulatory
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 29,185, 56 Fed. Reg. 22,490 (1991);
Self-Regulatory Organization Automated Systems, 55 Fed. Reg. 17,932 (1990).
43. An example is the new Wunsch Software System, which will allow investors
to balance the dollar amounts of buy and sell orders in the system and avoid possible
cash flow problems. Arizona to Offer Balancing in New Software Release, WALL STREET
LETTER, Sept. 14, 1992, at S8.
44. Arbitrage only occurs when the price of a commodity is different in one market
than in another market. Arbitrageurs buy in the cheap market and sell in the
expensive market, thereby increasing demand (and increasing price) in the cheap
market and increasing supply (and decreasing price) in the expensive market. See
Mary Kuntz & Jill Dutt, It's Man vs. Machine on Wall Street; Computer Trading Sparks
a New Debate, NEWSDAY, Nov. 5, 1989, at 95. The potential for arbitrage, i.e., the price
discrepancy, may be indicative of an inefficient or inaccurate market. The arbitrage
should tend to equalize prices, thereby increasing efficiency.
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precondition for index arbitrage.45
The advent of automated communication systems has brought
mixed results. Those aspects of the system which are
automated work much more efficiently than they did before
automation.4 The negative results have come about as a result
of the collision between state-of-the-art technology and a
Nineteenth-century market structure with a human link.47 In
order to understand how the automation process could be im-
proved, one must look at the major automated systems cur-
rently linking the investors to the exchanges, and the
exchanges to each other.
1. SuperDOT-The NYSE uses an automated order routing
system called the Designated Order Turnaround (DOT) system,
which, with its current enhancements, has been dubbed
"SuperDOT."48 Originally designed to accommodate orders up
45. See Solomon & Dicker, supra note 20, at 217-18. Without the electronic link,
floor brokers must physically walk to trading posts to execute trades and manually
write a floor ticket for each trade. Id. at 218. Since the profitability of arbitrage
depends on timing, only the large brokerage firms with many floor brokers can continue
without automation. Id.
46. For example, compared to the NYSE, which may charge as much as eight cents
per share for trading on the floor, a full-time automated system developed by Madoff
Investment Securities executes trades for its clients at no charge. Business World,
supra note 40. "Madoff is now the Big Board's largest competitor, trading five percent
of the stock exchange's entire share of volume." Id.
47. Talk of automating the stock exchanges inevitably raises the specter of
program trading, a form of automated index arbitrage which was blamed, at least in
part, for the Market Crash of 1987. Kuntz & Dutt, supra note 44. In October of 1987,
exogenous market factors, including the U.S. government's announcement of a higher-
than-expected trade deficit and an announcement by Congress regarding pending anti-
takeover legislation, precipitated a price decline on the NYSE. Once that occurred,
price discrepancies between index futures and the underlying securities led index
arbitrageurs to sell stock, putting pressure on prices. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS 15-16 (1988) [hereinafter MARKET MECHANISMS
REPORT]. This volume overcame the capacities of the DOT system, and investors could
no longer be confident that futures prices accurately reflected stock prices. Panic-
stricken portfolio managers then unloaded massive amounts of securities on the market
because of their inability to insure their portfolios through the futures market. Id. at
15-44.
It is possible that, had a national market system for securities been implemented
prior to 1987, the Crash could have been substantially ameliorated. A more efficient
linkage between the two systems might have prevented the price discrepancies which
accelerated the price decline. Donald E. Weeden, October Crash Proves Need for
National Market System, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1988, at 34.
48. Other exchanges have similar order routing systems. For example, the
American Stock Exchange's equivalent to the DOT is the Post Execution Reporting
(PER) system. 5 LosS & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 2559. The regional exchanges
also have automated order execution systems; the Midwest Stock Exchange, the Pacific
Stock Exchange, and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange operate the MAX, SCOREX, and
PACE systems, respectively. Id. at 2560; Seligman, supra note 39, at 111-13.
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to 199 shares,49 SuperDOT currently accepts orders of a much
larger magnitude.5" Seventy percent of the NYSE trading
volume occurs through SuperDOT.51
SuperDOT eliminates eight. of the seventeen human inter-
actions in the completion of a trade. The broker can key the
transaction directly into SuperDOT, which routes the order in
a single link directly to the specialist's post, replacing the links
from the broker to the New York trading room, from the
trading room to the floor booth, and from the floor booth to the
specialist's post, a significant breakthrough. One advantage of
the SuperDOT system is that it eliminates the cost of a floor
broker and the attendant support staff in the floor booth and
the trading room. Additionally, it eliminates the human errors
that may have occurred in the eliminated communication
links.52 Finally, SuperDOT greatly enhances the efficacy of the
clearance and settlement functions, the "back office" functions
described earlier.53 SuperDOT reports the trade directly to the
National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) 5' to begin the
clearance and settlement process.
For all SuperDOT's advantages, there are at least two
disadvantages. First, the system is relatively slow. "[Tihe
system is often not fast enough to permit a broker to confirm to
the customer the price at which an order was executed during
the phone call in which the order was placed."55 Clearly,
SuperDOT is light years ahead of the previous human-link
49. 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 2554.
50. SuperDOT currently accepts member firm preopening market orders up to
30,099 shares through the Opening Automated Report Service (OARS), pairing buy and
sell orders and presenting the imbalance to each specialist up to the opening of a stock,
thus assisting the specialist in setting opening prices. FACT BOOK 1992, supra note 2,
at 22. During 1992, SuperDOT processed an average of 180,000 orders per day. Id.
The system provides for rapid execution and reporting of market orders-in 1992,
market orders were executed and reported back to the originating firm on average
within 30 seconds. Id. SuperDOT also is used for two recently approved off-hours
trading processes known as Crossing Sessions I and II. These allow firms to trade at
the NYSE closing prices, either individually or in multiple stock bundles of more than
one million dollars, after regular trading has closed. Id. at 23.
51. Hansell, supra note 17, at 172. 45.3 billion shares were traded on the NYSE
in 1992. FACT BOOK 1992, supra note 2, at 22. Of these, 23.9 billion were routed on
SuperDOT. Id. Presumably, this represents a larger percentage of trades than of
shares traded because of SuperDOT's limitation to smaller trades.
52. Such errors are quite costly. See supra note 38.
53. For a discussion of the back office crisis, see supra notes 30-36 and
accompanying text.
54. For a history of the development of the Securities Industry Automation
Corporation, the NSCC's precursor, see Seligman, supra note 39, at 87-88.
55. 5 LoSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 2556.
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communication system, but in the computer age, users expect
immediate response times.5"
Second, the system still relies on floor brokers and specialists
to execute the trade.57 The NYSE might argue that this is a
positive aspect of the system because of the possibility for
negotiation. According to the NYSE, thirty-eight percent of all
trades are executed "between the quotes," in other words, at a
better price than could be obtained if the face-to-face dickering
that occurs on the floor was unable to occur.58 Presumably, this
allows the traders to exercise judgment regarding price and
quantity in executing trades.
Even assuming that better prices are obtained by such a
system, the fallacy of this reasoning remains: the statement
assumes the existing system, absent the face-to-face dickering.
56. Id. at 2556-57. Moreover, the system previously relied primarily on printers
on the floor of the NYSE as the interface to the humans at the specialist post. On
"Black Monday," October 19, 1987, the SEC found that "certain printers were creating
delays from two to 75 minutes in market or limit orders." Id. at 2557; see also GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE OCTOBER 1987 CRASH 70-75
(1988).
57. Robert J. McCartney, Big Board, Big Birthday, Big Questions: NYSE Marks
200 Years, But Faces Cloudy Future, WASH. POST, May 19, 1992, at C1.
Signs are numerous that the exchange, for all its expensive high-tech innovation,
needs to do more to adjust to the twin technological revolutions in computers and
telecommunications. In an era where computer-driven trading strategies in Tokyo
can trigger a stock purchase in London only seconds later, the traders who hustle
around the NYSE floor each day still write orders with pencils on slips of paper
that litter the floor by the closing bell.
Id.
58. This holds true, however, only when the quote spread (the difference between
the price at which a specialist is willing to buy and the price at which he is willing to
sell) is greater than the smallest spread possible. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.;
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 20,350,48 Fed. Reg.
51,722 (1983) (approved Nov. 4, 1983). Thus, to the extent an automated system was
able to reduce spreads, this advantage of the human interaction on the floor would be
mooted.
Consistent with academic usage, this Note refers to the difference between the bid
and ask price for a security as the "spread." See, e.g., Dale A. Oesterle et al., The New
York Stock Exchange and Its Out Moded Specialist System: Can the Exchange Innovate
To Survive?, 17 J. CORP. L. 223, 276-77 (1992). On the floor of the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (CME), however, traders use the word "spread" as a term of art to denote the
difference in price between two similar, but not identical contracts. A notable example
is the so-called "TED spread," or the difference in price between Treasury bill futures
and Eurodollar futures. The spread between these two commodity futures is actually
traded as a commodity itself. Traders distinguish this form of trading from arbitrage,
defining arbitrage as trading on the difference in prices of the same or similar
commodities between exchanges. Interview with John F. O'Donovan, Eurodollar futures
broker, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, in Oden, Mich. (Nov. 29, 1992).
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To the extent that this dickering occurs, and there is reason to
believe that it is rare, 59 investors must be putting forth a quote
assuming some room for dickering. If the dickering were
eliminated, then the rigors of competition would lead to
investors and brokers entering their "real" bottom line price
into the system for execution, rather than entering "negotiation
positions." Thus, there would be no need for the dickering, and
no need for the brokers who use it to justify their existence.
2. The Intermarket Trading System-While the vast
majority of stock trades occur on the NYSE, there is still
trading which occurs on the seven regional exchanges. There
is, therefore, interest in ensuring that a trade executed on the
exchange offers the best price at any given moment.60 The
markets' response to this concern is the Intermarket Trading
System (ITS). ITS is a communications link between the
market centers which allows a broker or specialist on the floor
of one exchange to transmit orders to a broker on one of the
other exchanges.61  The system is very labor-intensive-it
requires a human to see the market order and respond in order
to execute a trade.62 For this reason and others related to its
technological simplicity, the ITS has been compared to "two tin
cans and a string," or "a tom-tom in the space age."63 The
brokers and specialists like the ITS because it maintains their
central role in the trading process. More importantly, the ITS
has had comparatively little impact on exchange trading."
59. Quote spreads have been consistently narrowing over time. In 1983, the quote
spread was less than 1/4 point 60.7% of the time; in 1992, it was less than 1/4 point
86.4% of the time. FACT BOOK 1992, supra note 2, at 19.
60. Or, at least, at the best price offered by any exchange at the moment. In fact,
this is a requirement under the SEC's "trade through" rule. See NYSE Rule 15A,
N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) I 2015A (May 1993).
61. Seligman, supra note 39, at 94. For a thorough account of the ITS, see id. at
94-95; 5 LosS & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 2564-67.
62. This is with the exception of the NASDAQ SOES system and the Cincinnati
stock exchange's "black box" NSTS system, where the trade is executed automatically.
See infra Parts II.A & II.B.
63. Richard E. Rustin, Driving Force: As Big Board President, John J. Phelan
Pushes Changes in Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 1980, at 16, quoted in Seligman,
supra note 39, at 94 & n.75.
64. 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 2566. ITS today accounts for only a
small percentage of consolidated share trading volume. Id. The ITS has not had an
impact on primary market spreads, and there did not appear to be a significant
difference between the level of price volatility for ITS stocks and non-ITS stocks. Id.
(citing SEC, A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE INTERMARKET TRADING SYSTEM
1978-1982, at 48-49 (1982)).
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C. The Human Element: Floor Brokers and Specialists
The common element of all the major automation systems in
the stock market is that they retain a role for the floor broker
and the specialist. Why? What value do the floor broker and
the specialist add to the process? The first argument advanced
for retaining the floor brokers and specialists is simply because
they are human. Not that they are human beings, and
therefore deserving of keeping their jobs, 5 but that they are
human beings and therefore are capable of exercising judgment
in a way that computers are not. As has been pointed out:
To stand on an exchange floor is to feel that you're in the
center of the universe. It's a crucible of molten informa-
tion, with currents of supply and demand swirling through
-eddies of news and rumor. You can see, hear, smell and
feel the other traders. Screens may be accurate to the last
decimal point, but they don't raise their voices when they're
excited or sweat when they're afraid. All of these telltale
details come together on a trading floor every day to tell
the story of why prices are moving the way they are.6
The answer to that criticism is simple: the key to the market
is information. While the computer may provide less tactile,
emotional information, it and the other technologies which may
accompany it eventually will provide the trader with infinitely
more information. It's a new way of doing business, but so was
the spreadsheet.
1. Floor Brokers-Specifically in the case of the floor
broker, the value added to the trading process is expertise and
judgment. In theory, the floor broker acts as the agent of an
investor, negotiating the trade for the investor, and executing
it at the best terms available. In reality, the broker is merely
a conduit, indicating to the market the investor's willingness to
trade. The only term of trade at issue is the price, and most of
the time the price is set by the market and is not reflective of
the "negotiating skill" of the broker.67
65. After all, we are talking about capitalism
66. Hansell, supra note 17, at 179-80.
67. See Farrar, supra note 10, at 114.
The concept of a central continuous auction market underlying major stock
exchanges relies on centralization of the flow of orders to ensure that all buying
interest in a given security is exposed to all selling interest in that security at any
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The broker's judgment becomes important in deciding how to
time the market. The hallmark of a good broker is knowing
when to make a trade, and, to a lesser extent, with whom.
Timing the trade can be critical, particularly when a broker is
trying to buy or sell a large order without disrupting the
market. 68 However critical timing is, there is little reason why
a skilled trader cannot use the same judgment in executing
trades over the computer.69  Trading over the computer will
require a different, but complementary, set of skills from those
utilized by traders on the exchange floors. It is likely that there
would be some turnover in personnel making the trades.7 °
However, given the entrepreneurial spirit inherent in the
capital markets, not only would the job be done, but it would
be done more effectively at a computer screen:
Traders want control. They want to know every last
scrap of information about the market, and they want to
move on it instantly. In a simpler age, the best spot for a
trader was on an exchange floor watching supply meet
point in time. In theory, a "crowd' of broker-dealers holding orders to buy or sell,
say, General Motors stock, congregates at the post on the exchange's trading floor
where GM is traded....
Although "crowds" of half a dozen or more brokers ... do form from time to
time when that stock is active, they are anything but typical of the public auction
at which most exchange transactions take place. Usually, a public order to buy
100 shares of XYZ Corporation "at the market" is taken by a broker-dealer to the
post and executed in a "crowd" that contains only one other person-the specialist
franchised by the exchange to make a market in XYZ stock.
Id.
68. Interview with John F. O'Donovan, supra note 58.
69. See Ivy Schmerken, Wall Street's Quiet Revolution; Technology, WALL STREET
& TECH., June 1992, at 35-36.
Entrepreneurs like Evan Schulman of Lattice Trading, in Boston, are inventing
an electronic broker that can route orders to multiple crossing networks and to
various electronic exchange execution systems . ... "You want to develop a
system that gives money managers real-time control over orders,' says Schulman.
That's the advantage that the specialist has. "With a wave of his fingers he can
change your quote,' says Schulman. If the investment manager had real-time
control over his orders, coupled with the ability to change limit prices, retrieve
orders and cancel them, says Schulnan, "then the specialist [wouldn't] have to be
at the end of the line anymore.'
Id.
70. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, Going 'Floorless' in Canada, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
1992, § 3, at 15 (stating that about 20% of floor workers lost their jobs when the
Vancouver exchange floor closed).
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demand, poised to shout an order the moment opportunity
occurred. Today a trader has to monitor a dozen different
markets, news from around the world and complex
quantitative analytics, and the best spot to do this is a
trading desk surrounded by a bank of screens. In that
environment, traders are finding that trading through a
computer is faster and more precise than calling the floor.7'
Using modern programming techniques, including but not
limited to expert system technology72 and virtual reality,73
brokers also could engage in much more sophisticated trading
strategies over the network, without the need for real-time
human involvement. The crux of such a system would be the
analyst entering "rules" into the computer program which
would guide the computer's actions in any given situation. The
rules could be as simple as "execute the trade if the price
reaches 100," or as complex as "buy round lots of X corporation
at thirty-five unless the seller is institution Y, in which case,
buy at thirty-three [because institution Y is likely to place
enough additional shares on the market to drive the price down
71. Hansell, supra note 17, at 176-77.
72. Expert system technology is a form of artificial intelligence that utilizes
heuristic, or "rule of thumb," reasoning extracted from an interview process with
experts in the field, called "knowledge engineering." Expert systems have been
developed in such fields as medical diagnostics and engineering. See generally WILLIAM
R. ARNOLD & JOHN S. BOwIE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A PERSONAL, COMMONSENSE
JOURNEY 82-113 (1986). For a discussion of the future of artificial intelligence in
futures and options trading, -see The Future of Computers for Trading Futures,
FUTURES: MAG. COMMODITIES & OPTIONS, Sept. 15, 1991, at 8.
73. See, e.g., Mark Potts, Virtual Reality; Sci-Fi Technology on Verge of Billion
Dollar Boom, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1992, at HI.
It appears to be a landscape made up of paint chips-rolling hills of blue and
red squares .... The lone inhabitant of this odd, computer-created vista
maneuvers among the chips, as if in flight ....
[Each colored square represents a stock, its price and activity determining its
position and color.... By wandering through this surreal, computer-generated
field, a stock trader can see in an instant how individual stocks are performing,
relative to others. That may allow the trader to buy and sell shares more quickly
than a competitor studying a more traditional list of prices-an edge that can
mean millions of dollars in profit in fast-paced financial markets. Already being
tested on Wall Street, the system is one of the first commercial applications of
virtual reality computing.
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in the near future].b"74 The only limits to the trading strategies
which may be employed under such a system are the technical
limitations of the system and the imagination of the trader.
2. Specialists-What do the specialists do? Clearly, they
are more than simple communication conduits.7" They do act
as brokers, trading for other investor's accounts, but they act as
"market makers," also buying and selling securities for their
own account when no investors are available on the other side
of a transaction. In connection with this "market making"
activity, specialists have three functions beyond that of the
broker: (i) they are charged with a negative trading obligation,
(ii) they are responsible for setting the opening prices, and (iii)
they are charged with an affirmative trading obligation.
The negative trading obligation prohibits the specialist from
trading more than is necessary to maintain an orderly market.7"
It is imposed upon the specialist because of his unique market
position and knowledge.77 This obligation adds nothing to the
market; rather, it merely prevents the specialist from acting to
harm the integrity of the market.7" In theory, it is similar to
the obligation to disclose or refrain from trading79 placed on
corporate insiders by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in
the sense that specialists, like corporate insiders, have access
to information which they could use to defraud the market.
The advantage of having a specialist responsible for setting
opening prices, like the advantage of the broker, lies in his
judgment and expertise. The opening price of a security, and
perhaps to a larger extent, the closing price, is a very important
signal to the market. Thus, these prices can have a significant
impact on the subsequent performance of the market.
Moreover, the closing price has a major real world impact on
settlement vis-a-vis the futures market. A single tick can mean
74. Christopher Keith, The Overdue Revolution; Equity Trading in the
Post-Electronic Age: A Working Plan for a Customer-Based System, INVESTMENT
DEALERS' DIG., Sept. 30, 1991, at 14.
75. For a detailed description of the NYSE specialist system, see Oesterle et al.,
supra note 58; see also Ralph James & Estelle James, Disputed Role of the Stock
Exchange Specialist, HARv. Bus. REV., May-June 1962, at 133; Nicholas Wolfson &
Thomas A. Russo, The Stock Exchange Specialist: An Economic and Legal Analysis,
1970 DuKE L.J. 707.
76. NYSE Rule 104.10, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 1 2104-10(3) (Nov. 1992).
77. 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 2517-18.
78. See JOEL SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 342-44 (1981).
79. This obligation is addressed in Rule lOb-5. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1992). See,
e.g., Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); 7-8 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at
3485-728.
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the difference of literally millions of dollars for certain inves-
tors. The experienced hand of a knowledgeable specialist is
certainly one way to accurately set opening prices and control
closing prices.80 Like the broker's experience and judgment,
however, there appears to be no significant reason why this
judgment cannot be made in an automated environment. It
also should be noted that even the vaunted specialist's
judgment is not infallible. Errors in price setting during the
October 1987 market break are thought to have led to greater
uncertainty in what was already a highly volatile period."'
Finally, the specialist has certain affirmative trading obli-
gations.8 2 These obligations are: (i) the specialist must main-
tain an adequate level of capitalization to permit him to trade
against the market, 3 that is, to be a "buyer of last resort," at
least against mild market downturns 4 and (ii) the specialist
must actually trade against the market, within reason, when
necessary to maintain an orderly market. It is unclear exactly
how often the specialist performs this second obligation, or how
effective or necessary it is when she does. 5
The specialist's affirmative trading obligations are incurred
in exchange for the privilege of being a specialist-a very
lucrative privilege indeed. Specialists make their money, in
addition to charging brokerage commissions, by the traditional
method-buying low and selling high. 6  Specialists have an
80. Interview with John F. O'Donovan, supra note 58.
81. MARKET MECHANISMS REPORT, supra note 47, at 46-47, 53.
82. NYSE Rule 104.10, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 1 2104-10 (Nov. 1992).
83. Under NYSE Rule 104.20, the specialist "must be able to assume a position of
150 trading units (15,000 shares) in each common stock in which he or she is
registered; 30 trading units in each convertible preferred stock; 1,200 shares in each of
the 100 share trading unit nonconvertible preferred stocks; and 300 shares in each of
the 10 share unit nonconvertible preferred stocks. In addition, each specialist or
specialist unit must have net liquid assets equal to $1 million or 25 percent of position
requirements." 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 2514-15; see also NYSE Rule
104.20, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2104.20 (Dec. 1991).
84. See MARKET MECHANISMS REPORT, supra note 47, at 49-50.
It is understandable that specialists would not sacrifice large amounts of
capital in what must have seemed a hopeless attempt to stem overwhelming
waves of selling pressure. Nevertheless, from the final hours of trading on
October 19 through October 20, [1987, the "1987 Crash"] a substantial number of
NYSE specialists appear not to have been a significant force in counterbalancing
market trends.
Id. at 50.
85. MARKET MECHANISMS REPORT, supra note 47, at 49-50.
86. See Oesterle et al., supra note 58, at 276-77.
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explicitly granted monopoly on making the market in a given
security. 7 This extraordinary position in the market allows
them to make money on their trades over eighty percent of the
time. 8 While there is no direct evidence that specialists abuse
this position, the monopoly power inherent in the position itself
is too dangerous to countenance without a demonstrable benefit
to the market as a whole. Moreover, while specialists may
create enough benefit to the market to allow them to exist
under the current regime, the benefits do not seem substantial
enough to maintain the physical exchanges solely for the
purpose of perpetuating the role of the specialist.8 9
In 1971, the SEC evaluated the usefulness and the discipline
of specialists with regard to their affirmative trading obliga-
tion.9 ° The study found that specialists frequently fail to
provide sufficient depth, in other words, purchase or sell enough
securities for their own account, to maintain an orderly
market.9' This may be because specialists have a compelling
economic interest in failing to provide such depth. Specialists
who best fulfilled their affirmative trading obligation averaged
about a twenty-nine percent return, while bearing considerable
risk; however, those specialists who allowed greater price
fluctuations earned about 191% while assuming less risk.9 2 The
study concluded that competition, rather than regulation, would
be the best method for ensuring market depth.93
87. See NYSE Rule 390, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 1 2390 (Mar. 1989). This rule
generally prohibits stock exchange members from acting as market makers in competi-
tion with NYSE specialists. See Seligman, supra note 39, at 80. But cf 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.19c-1, .19c-3 (1992) (exempting certain securities from the scope of Rule 390).
88. The NYSE characterizes this phenomenon as the "specialists' stabilization
rate." "The NYSE expects each specialist to stabilize stock price movements by buying
and selling from his own account against the prevailing trend of the market.
Specialists' stabilization rate, the percentage of shares purchased at prices below or sold
at prices above the last different price, was 78.3% [in 1992]." FACT BOOK 1992, supra
note 2, at 19.
89. In fact, Professor Poser, while arguing against the adoption of a national
market system, argued for the elimination of the present specialist system in favor of
an institutionalized specialist function. Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock
Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883,
956-57 (1981).
90. SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY (1971).
91. Farrar, supra note 10, at 114.
92. Id. at 114-15.
93. "It is one thing to prevent a man by rule from beating his wife; it is quite
another to try in the same way to require him to be kind to her." Id. at 115.
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Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that specialists do play
a useful role in the market,94 this still would not justify
maintaining the physical exchanges just to keep the specialists
in operation.95 Any useful role that the specialist does play can
continue to be played in an automated exchange system. Any
dealers who want to hold themselves out as market makers in
a particular security could be subject to the obligation.
Alternatively, if no one wanted to hold themselves out as a
market maker, the SEC could monitor, through sophisticated
computer tracking systems, those who deal at a specified
volume in a given security and impose the obligation on them.96
Moreover, the profitability of being a specialist would not
disappear under an automated network, and thus, the
obligations need not either. Hence, in a competitive environ-
ment, the affirmative trading obligation may not even be
necessary:
There is every reason to believe, however, that compe-
tition between market makers in a single marketplace
would provide the needed inducement for dealers to place
their capital on the line. Market making can be very
remunerative, especially for dealers who participate in a
large volume of trading. Under a competitive regime, any
dealer whose quotes and depth are not competitive would
simply forfeit to others the opportunity to participate in all,
or at least part, of that volume.
Of course, this all assumes that the role of an identified
specialist continues to be necessary given a truly automated,
universal network. That may not be the case. The capital
market itself, through competition, may provide the necessary
liquidity.98
94. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 775-78.
95. See Oesterle et al., supra note 58, for a forceful argument for the reform of the
NYSE specialist system.
96. The SEC may note have the resources to do this effectively, however.
97. Farrar, supra note 10, at 115.
98. Jonathon Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The
Emergence of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75
CORNELL L. REv. 1007, 1014-20 (1990).
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II. THE ALTERNATIVES
There is only one religion, though there are a hundred
versions of it.9 9
The SEC, in the past, has argued for a Universal Message
Switch (UMS), which would replace and significantly expand
the SuperDOT system.100 The UMS would operate much like
the SuperDOT system in that it would transmit order
information directly to the floor of the exchange. The UMS,
however, would transmit the order to all exchanges. Thus, the
ITS, which currently transmits orders among exchanges would
become obsolete immediately, and argument over "best
execution" would become a thing of the past, as orders would
automatically be transmitted to the exchange offering the best
price. 1° 1
Arguments also have been put forth for a Combined Limit
Order Book (CLOB), which would automate and universalize
the specialists' limit order books.10 2 To understand the CLOB,
one must understand the current limit order book system. The
foregoing discussion has centered on so-called "market orders,"
or orders to be executed at whatever price prevails in the
market when the order hits the floor. Investors also can place
"limit orders," or orders to be executed contingent on the
market achieving a price set by the investor. Currently, the
specialist at the NYSE would execute the order if it reached the
set price at the NYSE. There is potential for the order to
remain unexecuted on the NYSE, even though it may have been
99. George Bernard Shaw, quoted in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 498 (3d
ed. 1979).
100. Development of National Market System, Exchange Act Release No. 14,416,
[1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81,502 (Jan. 26, 1978). Request for
Comment on Development of Order Routing and Market Linkage Systems, Exchange
Act Release No. 14,885, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,625 (June
23, 1978); see also Seligman, supra note 39, at 133-37.
101. See Securities; Brokerage and Research Services, Exchange Act Release No.
23,170, 51 Fed. Reg. 16,004, at 16,011 (1986); Kidder, Peabody & Co., Exchange Act
Release No. 8,426, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 77,618, at
83,323 (Oct. 16, 1968); see generally Request for Comment on U.S. Equity Market
Structure Study, Exchange Act Release No. 30,920, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 85,012 (July 14, 1992).
102. See Morris Mendelson et al., Toward a Modern Exchange: The Peake-
Mendelson-Williams Proposal for an Electronically Assisted Auction Market, in
IMPENDING CHANGES FOR SECURITIES MARKETS: WHAT ROLE FOR THE EXCHANGE? 53,
55-60 (Ernest Bloch & Robert A. Schwartz eds., 1979).
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executed on another exchange. The CLOB would eliminate this
potential by displaying the limit order to specialists on every
exchange. Thus, the order is guaranteed execution if any
exchange reaches the set price.
103
These proposals do not go far enough, however. Each
maintains a central role for the physical exchanges, and thus
merely makes the existing system moderately more efficient,
forgoing the opportunity to create what potentially could be a
radically more efficient system. One can envision both concepts
incorporated naturally as part of an integrated system. The
UMS and the CLOB would only be two functions of a more
comprehensive unified system. The challenge is how best to
encourage the development of such a system.
Alternatives to the current system exist today. Each has its
flaws, but with certain modifications, easily could replace the
current system. And each proves that the physical exchange
itself is not necessary. If the current system is proven not to be
indispensable, then we have paved the way for a system which
lessens some of the shortcomings of the physical exchange.
A. The NASDAQ
The National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotation (NASDAQ)'" system operates on a paradigm
completely different from the physical exchanges. Rather than
centralize trading on a trading floor, the NASDAQ system
connects brokers over an automated network, which allows
them to negotiate directly with each other and bypasses the
floor broker and the specialist entirely. Orders are entered in
the NASDAQ system and literally must be negotiated with a
dealer holding an offsetting order to be executed. Thus, the
NASDAQ system does not eliminate the human touch; it merely
eliminates the middle man, the floor broker.'0 5
103. See Wiliam R. Harman, The Evolution of the National Market System-An
Overview, 33 Bus. LAW. 2275, 2286, 2295-96 (1978); see also Cohen, supra note 3, at
772-75; Poser, supra note 89, at 927-31.
104. Securities listed on the NASDAQ must be registered with the SEC under
§ 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1988). The NASD
itself is registered as a self-regulatory organization under § 15A of the Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o (1988).
105. For a thorough description of the NASDAQ system, see Michael J. Simon &
Robert L.D. Colby, The National Market System for Over-The-Counter Stocks, 55 GEO.
WAsH. L. REv. 17 (1986).
WINTER 1993]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 26:2
The key role in the NASDAQ system is played by the "market
maker." Market makers are, in some respects, the analog of
the specialist on the NYSE, in that they hold themselves out as
willing and able to buy or to sell a security at any time,
regardless of whether they have an offsetting order.1"6 There
are at least two differences between the market maker and the
specialist, however. First, the market maker does not have a
monopoly.' v For any given security, there may be any number
of market makers.' 8 These market makers are in competition
with one another for the lucrative business of trading in that
security. That competition, at least in theory, should result in
more favorable prices to the investor. Second, the NASDAQ
market maker is not subject to the affirmative trading
obligations of the NYSE specialist.'0 9 The market maker may
withdraw from the market at will, although, under current
rules, the penalty for an unexcused withdrawal is a suspension
from the market for twenty days."0 This rule was adopted in
the wake of the 1987 market break, where the withdrawal of
market makers was deemed to have contributed to the failure
of the over-the-counter market."'
In addition to the full NASDAQ system, there is a subsystem
that does not require dealer negotiation. The Small Order
Execution System (SOES) allows brokers to enter orders for up
to 200, 500, or 1000 shares, which then are executed
automatically at the best market price. The SOES currently
106. See NASD Bylaws, Schedule D, Part VI, § 2, Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers Man.
(CCH) 1 1819 (July 1992).
107. Compare the discussion of the monopoly granted to NYSE specialists, supra
notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
108. In fact, in 1982, the 3664 securities traded over the NASDAQ system averaged
7.6 market makers each. NAT'L ASS'N OF SECURITIES DEALERS, ANALYSIS OF THE
IMPACT OF LAST SALE REPORTING ON MARKET CHARACTERISTICS OF TIER 2 NASDAQ
SECURITIES 3 (1983); Seligman, supra note 39, at 95.
109. For a discussion of the specialists' affirmative trading obligation, see supra
notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
110. SEC, DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK
9-25 n.86 (1988). P]ending news, a sudden influx of orders or price changes, [and
effecting] transactions with competitors shall not constitute acceptable reasons for
granting excused withdrawal status." NASD Bylaws, Schedule D, Part VI, § 8(b), Nat'l
Ass'n Sec. Dealers Man. (CCH) 1824 (July 1992).
111. MARKET MECHANISMS REPORT, supra note 47, at VI-49 (explaining that the
withdrawal of market makers from the market, among other things, prevented buyers
and sellers of NASD-listed securities from executing desired transactions promptly).
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handles 1.3% of the total NASDAQ volume.112 The SOES has
been praised for increasing the efficiency of the market,113 but
it also has its flaws. In addition to the potential for market
makers to withdraw, the SOES suffers from periodic "locked,"
or "crossed," markets. These occur when the normal
relationship between "bid" or purchase prices and "ask" or sale
prices is upset. Typically, the market maker will "bid" a lower
price than they "ask."
Buy low, sell high. Due to quirks in the SOES, however, the
"bid" price can, at times, equal or exceed the "ask" price. When
this happens, the market cannot function, as market makers
will not buy securities for more than they can sell them. The
SOES, therefore, is limited to small, non-professional trades."4
The NASDAQ system is particularly interesting as an
example for eliminating the exchange floor because it has been
used as a model for exactly that. The London Stock Exchange
uses a quote driven, competing dealer market called the Stock
Exchange Automated Quotations (SEAQ) system."5  As Sir
Andrew Hugh-Smith, Chairman of the International Stock
Exchange, has explained:
NASDAQ, the computer system that forms the basis of
America's national over-the-counter trading operation, was
the model the London Exchange used to set up its own
computerized trading system. One result was a big growth
in trading volume. But there was also another effect.
Although [they] made provision for trading to continue on
the floor, within two weeks, virtually every firm had
decided to pull out of the floor and rely entirely on the
screen-based systems."
6
112. Self-Regulatory Organizations; NASD; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change
to Define Professional Trader for Purposes of the Small Order Execution System,
Exchange Act Release No. 26,361, 53 Fed. Reg. 51,605, at 51,606 (1988); 5 Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 2588.
113. MARKET MECHANISMS REPORT, supra note 47, at VI-53.
114. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; NASD; Order Approving Proposed Rule
Change to Define Professional Trader for Purposes of the Small Order Execution
System, Exchange Act Release No. 26,361, 53 Fed. Reg. 51,605, at 51,605-06; 5 Loss
& SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 2591. The NASD has suspended firms for violating this
rule by breaking large orders up into 1000 share blocks. See Suspension by NASD, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 1992, at D8.
115. Karmel, supra note 12, at 3.
116. Business World, supra note 40.
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B. The Cincinnati Stock Exchange
The Cincinnati Stock Exchange has instituted a "black-box"
trading system known as the National Securities Trading
System (NSTS). 117 The exchange completely eliminates human
communication in a way that exceeds even the NASDAQ's
elimination of the trading floor. Brokers deal with the NSTS
exclusively through the computer-no human communication
takes place. The NSTS accepts orders from brokers and
executes them against matching orders." 8 Orders are prioritiz-
ed according to price (high for purchases, low for sales); time of
entry determines priority for orders at the same price.119
Traders can try to negotiate a better price by entering prices
into their terminal slightly above or slightly below the quoted
price. This is the definitive feature of the NSTS-matching the
physical exchanges' ability to allow traders to deal "between the
quotes." 2 °
The NSTS, however, is not flawless. Its primary flaw appears
to be the human costs of monitoring the system. 2 ' It appears
impossible, given the structure of the NSTS, to insert trades
automatically.'22 Each must be inserted into the system
individually. This feature eliminates the potential for program
trading, an important recent development in major exchange
trading.'23 Also, as in the main NASDAQ system, trades are
not executed automatically. Traders must decide individually
117. 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 2562.
118. Id. at 2562-63.
119. Id. at 2562. An exception to the general rule that time of entry determines the
priority of orders at the same price is that public orders get priority over specialist or
dealer orders. Id.
120. Seligman, supra note 39, at 113.
121. SEC, A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE CINCINNATI STOCK EXCHANGE
NATIONAL SECURITIES TRADING SYSTEM 1978-1982, at 18 (1982); 5 LoSS & SELIGMAN,
supra note 13, at 2562-63.
122. 5 LoSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 2563.
123. "Program trading," as the term has become widely used, refers to buying and
selling stocks and their derivative instruments simultaneously in order to gain market
advantage. Its advantages include the potential for arbitrage (buying a security in one
market for a lower price than can be obtained by selling it or an equivalent derivative
instrument in another market), portfolio insurance (buying or selling a security in the
equity market while simultaneously taking an offsetting position in the futures market
to insure against wild market swings), and asset allocation and hedging (insuring a
well-diversified portfolio against market risk by taking an offsetting position in the
index futures market, rather than taking offsetting positions on single securities). See
Solomon & Dicker, supra note 20, at 205-15.
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whether to execute a trade or attempt to negotiate for a better
price. Thus, the NSTS replaces a group of human brokers on
the floor of an exchange with a group of human brokers sitting
in front of their computer screens. This feature eliminates the
most important benefit to be gained from an automated
system-efficiency. In order to be a model for a national
automated securities exchange system, trades must be able to
be ordered and executed by computers, without a human touch.
This requirement, however, may be met in the near future by
virtue of a new system being developed by Morgan Stanley.
Morgan Stanley's MatchPlus system will allow users to enter
orders, with a variety of limiting parameters, for automatic
execution.' 2' The system, while not part of the NSTS, is likely
to be linked to the NSTS in order to satisfy NYSE Rule 390,125
which prohibits member firms from trading outside of a
recognized exchange during regular business hours.'26
124. Morgan Stanley Deploys Black Box Trading System, TRADING SYSTEMS TECH.,
May 20, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
Morgan Stanley & Co. is offering its clients a new flavor of execution service
in the form of a black box equity trading system. The system--called MatchPlus
Patient Trading System-is designed to handle crosses of equity portfolios at low
cost and without market impact. The service will be available through several
quote vendors' terminal networks.
All New York Stock Exchange-listed and NASDAQ National Market System
stocks are eligible for crossing on MatchPlus, which will match orders
continuously during the NYSE trading day. Trade confirmation will be
instantaneous; users can constantly monitor the progress of their orders. But no
information-no order book-will be available to any participants.
Id.
125. NYSE Rule 390, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 1 2390 (Mar. 1978).
126. Id.; Morgan Stanley Deploys Black Box Trading System, supra note 124.
A black box matching system is a bit of a departure for an NYSE member firm
like Morgan Stanley. Member firms are bound by rule 390, which requires
daytime trades to occur on an exchange floor. Morgan Stanley's MatchPlus will
satisfy this requirement by executing and reporting its trades through a regional
stock exchange ....
The Cincinnati Stock Exchange is considered a likely suspect [to support the
system] because its comparatively thin order book makes crossing of matched
orders easier. Morgan Stanley has a computer-to-computer link with the
Cincinnati Stock Exchange.
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C. The Wunsch System
There is a new player in the electronic stock exchange game:
Steven Wunsch. With significant local support,127 he has
formed the "Arizona Stock Exchange," more commonly known
as the Wunsch system. The SEC classified the Wunsch system
as an exempt exchange under section five of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.12 The Wunsch system uses a single-
price auction system, 129 which runs after the NYSE closes each
day.
Using special software, buyers and sellers enter on their
computers the amount of stock and the price range at
which they're willing to deal. At the end of each day, the
orders are matched at the price that will execute most of
the trades .... [P]rices are set at the intersection of two
curves, one representing supply, the other demand.""
The Wunsch system "has low commission prices (1€ per share
or less), no bid and ask spreads, no floor and no specialists." 31
The system allows investors to enter their bids in an "open
book," where other investors can see the order, or in a "reserve
book," where other investors will not see the order until the
trade has been executed after the auction is over. 132 Trades not
executed return to the investor. 133 Wunsch is attempting to
build automatic bridges to other systems in order to execute
127. Exchanges and Regulators: Former Wunsch Auctions Systems, AZX Opens Up
In Arizona, TRADING SYSTEMS TECH., Apr. 6, 1992 [hereinafter AZX Opens Up],
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Oni File. "Arizona has committed $700,000 to
support the exchange, with a further $2 million on the way. AZX [the Arizona Stock
Exchange] is receiving the money in $50,000 monthly increments that will run through
1994." Id.
128. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Wunsch Auction Systems, Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 28,899, 56 Fed. Reg. 8377 (1991); Wunsch Auction Systems, Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,662 (Feb. 28,
1991).
129. The Treasury Department recently used a single price auction system, without
the automation, for the first time in its crucial Treasury bill auction. Marlene G. Star,
U.S. To Try Single-Price Treasury Auction, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, June 22, 1992,
at 1.
130. Eric Reguly, Cracks Appearing in NYSEs Armor, FIN. POST, May 15, 1992, at
15.
131. Id.
132. AZX Opens Up, supra note 127.
133. Id.
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investors' trades which are not executed in his "one-shot" per
day auction.
13
The Wunsch system, however, is not without its problems.
These stem primarily from its specialized design and function.
By design, it is a low volume, instantaneous one-price auction
system. While the system does arrive at its prices independent-
ly from the NYSE, an investor's trade either executes, or it does
not. If it does not, it is up to the investor to find an alternate
market for the trade.3 5 In that sense, it is as dependent on the
NYSE for liquidity as proprietary systems are dependent on the
NYSE for price determination, as investors typically would look
to the NYSE to execute trades which went unexecuted on the
Wunsch system.13 Moreover, the exchange operates once a day,
at 5:00 p.m, after the NYSE closes. Investors who prefer to
trade during the day must look elsewhere.137 It should be noted
that while the NYSE vigorously opposed the approval of the
Wunsch system, 3 ' it since has sought and received temporary
approval for its own after-hours trading system, created to




136. See Request for Comment on U.S. Equity Market Structure Study, Exchange
Act Release No. 30,920, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)1 85,012 (July
14, 1992).
137. Id. Steven Wunsch, predictably, takes the contrary position.
Wunsch argues that his system will actually improve liquidity because prices
will not change until a big volume of orders has piled up on both sides. Wunsch
says that most intra-day trading is just so much noise. Continuous trading gives
dealers and brokers the opportunity to clip off commissions and fractions on
trades. It also means order imbalances are frequent, since you can't expect all
potential buyers and sellers to appear at the same exact moment. That's why
stock prices-General Motors, for instance-may vary by $1 during a day even
if there's no news. Does it make sense that General Motors as a company could
be worth $1 billion more in the morning than in the afternoon?
Richard L. Stern, A Dwindling Monopoly, FORBES, May 13, 1991, at 66.
138. The NYSE vigorously opposes any competitive threats. See Oesterle et al.,
supra note 58, at 228; see also William Bower, Bicentennial Battle: Big Board at Age
2000, Scrambles to Protect Grip on Stock Market, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1991, at Al.
139. Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc.; Order Granting
Temporary Approval to Proposed Rule Changes Relating to NYSE's Off-Hours Trading
Facility, Exchange Act Release No. 29,237, 56 Fed. Reg. 24,853 (1991) (temporarily
approved on May 31, 1991); see generally SEC to Issue Decision on Fate of Big Board's
Off-Hours Trading System, SEC. WK., May 20, 1991, at 12 (describing NYSE's proposed
off-hours trading system).
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C. Globex
The closest thing to a truly global electronic market in
existence does not trade traditional equity securities. It trades
options and futures, including derivative equity instruments.
Formed by an alliance between the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, Reuters, and the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT),
Globex is heading rapidly toward including many of the world's
existing and emerging commodities and futures exchanges
within its electronic portals. 4 ° For example, Globex recently
signed an agreement with the Marche a Terme International de
France (MATIF) (a French options exchange) to allow members
of each exchange to trade contracts on either exchange through
the Globex system.'4
Globex, like the NSTS, is designed to operate as a "black
box," the computer system itself matches buyers with sellers.
Unlike the NSTS, however, Globex will execute trades
140. Futures Exchanges, OTC Marts Booming Globally, WALL STREET LETTER,
June 29, 1992, at S1.
New exchanges continue to open in Europe-Belfox in Brussels and Austria's
Otob are among the most recent. An Italian futures exchange, which will initially
just trade Italian bond futures, is also expected to be launched soon. Its opening
will bring the total number of exchanges worldwide to close to 75. The total
number of futures and options contracts traded on worldwide exchanges reached
over 58 million lots in May 1992.
Id.
141. CME, MATIF, U.S. Regulators Announce Start of Cross-Exchange Access
System, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1682'(Oct. 30, 1992) [hereinafter Cross-Exchange
Access System].
Patrick Simonnet, executive vice president, MATIF, said cross-exchange access
.means that MATIF members, as well as CME members on the reverse side, will
have the opportunity to trade products of other exchanges--members of the
GLOBEX system-around the clock, wherever the terminals for the sessions are
located."
Simonnet added that member-operators will be required to comply with the
rules of the exchange from which they are trading, as well as the rules of the
exchange listing the products on the Globex system.
Id. Globex also expects to enter into agreements with futures exchanges in Sydney,
Tokyo, and Hong Kong in the very near future. Globex Near-Term Expansion Plans
Included Hong Kong, Japan and Sydney, SEC. WK., Oct. 26, 1992, at 9.
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automatically. 42 But Globex does not replace the auction floor.
Globex is designed to complement floor trading, rather than
replace it. It operates only during hours the CBOT and CME
are closed, and does not have the physical capacity to handle
the peak loads which occur during the main trading hours.
143
It remains to be seen whether the floor can remain cost
competitive with the automated trading possible over Globex,
as the managers of Globex claim.'" As yet, however, no
commodities futures exchange in the world has opted for a
totally automated system.
145
Globex both solves and creates many regulatory problems.
For example, while the nature of electronic trading lends itself
to the creation of an audit trail, Globex will be regulators' first
attempt at regulating a twenty-four hour trading environ-
ment." Also, while traders on the network theoretically will
be bound by both the rules of their home exchange and the
exchange on which they are trading,147 many choice of law and
jurisdictional issues will arise once violations occur in
practice."4 To address this issue, the International Council of
Securities Associations established a working group to discuss
regulation of cross border electronic trading. 149 More issues are
sure to arise in this area as Globex becomes more ubiquitous in
the commodities futures market.
142. Stephen Davis, Globex: Chicago's Black Box Debuts, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,
May, 1992, at 21.
143. Globex Does Not Threaten Pit Trading in the Short Term, FIN. REG. REP.,
Apr. 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FRR File.
144. Id.
145. Ginger Szala, Futuristic Automation Now at Traders' Fingertips, FUTURES,
Jan. 1992, at 50.
. 46. Roger Fillion, Globex to Test Regulators on Twenty-four Hour, Global Trading,
REUTERS NEWS REP., June 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Router File.
147. Cross-Exchange Access System, supra note 141.
148. See, e.g., Leslie B. Samuels & Patricia A. Brown, Observations on the Taxation
of Global Securities Trading, 45 TAx. L. REV. 527 (1990).
149. Emerging Electronic Trading Exchanges Pose Increasing Headaches For
Regulators, THOMSON'S FIN. COMPLIANCE WATCH, Apr. 6,1992, at 4; see also Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, Policy Statement Concerning the Oversight of
Screen-Based Trading Systems, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,670 (1990).
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III. REFORM
Progress is impossible without change; and those who
cannot change their minds cannot change anything. 150
A. The Role of the SEC
In 1975, Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 "to facilitate the establishment of a national market
system for securities."' 51 Relatively little has been done by the
SEC in furtherance of this goal.'52 The SEC's ideological
preference for deregulation and noninterference during the
Reagan and Bush administrations tends to explain this
inaction. This ideological stance is firmly rooted in economic
theory and, in general, is supported by free market thinkers
such as the "Chicago" school of economics.153 It remains to be
seen how the Clinton SEC will deal with these issues. The
SEC, however, has a role under any administration in
influencing the means by which securities are exchanged in the
United States. Moreover, the form which the world's largest
market takes should be determined by market forces. Thus, the
examination of the SEC's role prompts a broader look at
competition in the capital markets themselves."5
There are essentially four levels of competition in the equity
capital markets: competition between investors for the "best
deals;" competition between brokers for the investor's business;
competition between exchanges for the broker's business; and
150. George Bernard Shaw, quoted in THE CONCISE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIONS 37 (Robert Andrews ed., 1987).
151. Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 110, (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78k-4(a)(2)
(1988)).
152. Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of
the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 315.
153. This ideological stance, not surprisingly, is also ubiquitous on the floors of the
exchanges. For example, on the floor of the CME, it is not uncommon to see brokers
sporting buttons carrying the motto "Free markets for free men." Interview with John
F. O'Donovan, supra note 58.
154. See generally Big Board v. Small Screen, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1991, at 12
(noting the tension between competition, which reduces cost-raising inefficiency, and
regulation, which prevents some customers from being able to find the best price when
shares are trading at different prices in different places).
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competition between countries for investment dollars. Of these,
the first is the competition upon which the capital market
thrives. This is the competition which the SEC attempts to
regulate most vigorously and which reflects the underlying
realities of the capital marketplace."' 5 The last, competition
between countries for investment dollars, occurs on a variety of
levels. It is influenced by (and influencing) currency exchange
rates, the methodology of exchange, the depth and stability of
the capital market, and the underlying structure of the nation's
economy itself.
156
The second and third forms of competition, competition
among brokers and competition among exchanges, are good only
to the extent that they facilitate the smooth and efficient
exchange of stock between investors. In other words, they are
good only to the extent that they facilitate competition between
investors. The assumption that it is necessary to maintain or
increase competition between these entities 57 itself assumes
that brokers and exchanges are necessary. Brokers probably
are necessary. They serve as the interface between the investor
uninitiated in the procedures and the language of the exchange
of stock.5 8 This function adds to the liquidity of the market by
making the market accessible to these investors. This Note
calls into question, however, the assumption that exchanges in
their current form are necessary at all. This is a question best
left to the market to determine. It is incumbent upon the SEC,
via section 11A, to structure the regulatory system to ensure
that there are no unnecessary impediments to competition
determining the structure of the market.'59
155. See SEC, POLICY STATEMENT ON THE STRUCTURE OF A CENTRAL MARKET
SYSTEM 8 (1973); SEC, STATEMENT ON THE FUTURE STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES
MARKETS 1-9 (1972).
156. See generally Charles C. Cox & Douglas C. Michael, The Market for Markets:
Development of International Securities and Commodities Trading, 36 CATH. U. L. REV.
833 (1987).
157. SEC, POLICY STATEMENT ON THE STRUCTURE OF A NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM
8-10 (1973).
158. Of course, this analysis does not apply to the sophisticated individual investor.
Query why it should be necessary for such an investor to pay brokerage fees when they
are more than capable of executing their own transactions. Eliminating these fees is
the intent of proprietary trading systems such as AUTEX and Instinet. See Seligman,
supra note 39, at 115-16.
159. Congress made this clear, explaining that:
[t]he bill approaches the problem of encouraging the development and
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A legitimate consideration is who should be responsible for
taking the lead in this effort. Should it be the government?
Particularly when it comes to "pure" economic issues, U.S.
policymakers have shown a preference for market-based
solutions, and for good reason: government is notoriously
inefficient. The financial community rightly should cringe at
the idea of a stock exchange run with the efficiency of the post
office." 0 Policymakers made no exception with regard to the
national market system. "It [was] the intent of the conferees
that the national market system evolve through the interplay
of competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory restrictions
[were] removed." 61
B. Specific Reform
This Note does not argue for a government-mandated
solution. Rather, it proposes that the government pave the way
for a market-based solution. The SEC can either protect the
near-monopoly position of the NYSE by enforcing the current
regulatory regime, or allow competitive forces to overcome
inertia by instituting an alternative regime.'62 This Note calls
for the development of alternative stock exchange mechanisms
through the implementation of a rule exempting exchanges
implementation of a national market system from the point of view of preserving
the competing markets for securities that have developed, breaking down all
barriers to competition that do not serve a valid regulatory purpose, and
encouraging maximum reliance on communication and data processing equipment
consistent with justifiable costs.
S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975); see also Seligman, supra note 39, at
131-32.
160. Or the DOD, or the SEC for that matter. Professor Poser claims that one of
the reasons for the SEC's failure to effect the changes envisioned by § 11A is its lack
of institutional competence as a "development agency," i.e., that the SEC is much
better at regulating the existing regime than it would be at creating a new one. Poser,
supra note 89, at 946-51.
161. H.R. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1975).
162. This dilemma was described by the Advisory Committee on a Central Market
System (the Walbert Committee) in its 1972 and 1973 reports. 173 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) I-1 to -7 (1972); 192 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) I-1 to -7 (1973). -Jrhat Committee
developed two positions known as Approach I and Approach II. Approach I urged a
gradual evolutionary approach.... Approach II... concluded that the present market
structure was simply incapable of evolving into ... a more integrated central market
system.... Approach II was substantially embraced by the SEC... ." Harman, supra
note 103, at 2281.
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which operate below a certain volume from the onerous burdens
of exchange regulation. The Securities Exchange Act defines an
exchange as
.... any organization, association, or group of persons,
whether incorporated or unincorporated, which constitutes,
maintains, or provides a market place or facilities for
bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for
otherwise performing with respect to securities the
functions commonly performed by a stock exchange as that
term is generally understood. 63
Classification as an exchange subjects the classified entity to a
variety of regulatory burdens. For example, securities
exchanges must file copies of proposed rules and proposed rule
changes for SEC approval or disapproval, 1' must undertake a
long list of other duties and responsibilities,'65 and must comply
with certain limitations on their activities.166 These regulatory
burdens create a barrier for potential entrants into the stock
exchange market. As the SEC noted in its exemption of the
Wunsch System from exchange regulation under section five of
the Securities Exchange Act, these regulatory burdens:
do not decrease in a purely linear fashion as volume de-
creases. Thus, there are minimum fixed costs of compli-
ance that these obligations entail even for small
exchanges.... On the other hand, the revenues of an
exchange are more directly related to volume and are not
in any sense fixed. For a proprietary exchange with ...
limited volume and thus limited revenues ... the costs of
compliance with the obligations and limitations of
registration would represent prohibitive business,
administrative, and financial burdens. 167
163. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) (1988); see also Board of Trade v. SEC, 923 F.2d 1270 (7th
Cir. 1991) (holding that a computerized system for trading options was not an
.exchange" that was required to be registered with the SEC).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (1988).
165. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(1)-(8) (1988).
166. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78k(a) (1988) (prohibiting members of exchanges from
trading for their own account); § 78f(c)(1) (1988) (providing that exchanges generally
may admit only broker-dealers and their associates as "members").
167. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Wunsch Auction Systems, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 28,899, 56 Fed. Reg. 8377, 8381 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
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The Wunsch System was given a unique limited volume
exception to exchange regulation under section 5 of the
Securities Exchange Act. 6 ' The SEC did not determine exactly
what volume the Wunsch System must stay under in order to
maintain its exception. However, it did strongly suggest that
the benchmark would be the volume on the Cincinnati Stock
Exchange.' 69 The SEC also required the Wunsch System to
forward certain reporting data to the SEC, regardless of
Wunsch's exemption from direct exchange regulation.7 v
The SEC should codify the exemption given the Wunsch
System, so that entrepreneurs with innovative ideas for the
exchange of stock can implement their ideas with confidence of
approval and with minimal regulatory burden. The maximum
volume should be large enough to ensure an adequate profit to
the system operator, and the exempt exchange should be given
explicit authority to trade securities that are listed on any
registered securities exchange or with any self-regulatory
organization. Once such a rule is in place, there should arise
a number of exempt stock exchanges which can operate
profitably under the specified volume. 7 ' Given the economies
168. Id. at 8380, 8383; see also Wunsch Auction Systems, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,662 (Feb. 28, 1991).
Section five of the Securities Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to grant an exemption
from registration if "by reason of the limited volume of transactions effected on [the]
exchange, it is not practicable and not necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors to require such registration." 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1988).
169. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Wunsch Auction Systems, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 28,899, 56 Fed. Reg. 8377, 8380, 8383 (1991).
The statute provides no absolute guidelines as to what level of volume does not
justify a continuing exemption. The Commission agrees generally with the NYSE,
however, that the present volume levels of fully regulated national securities
exchanges provide a useful benchmark. The Commission would be concerned over
the competitive implications of the Wunsch System operating pursuant to an
exemption if its volume exceeded that of any of the fully regulated national
securities exchanges. The Cincinnati Stock Exchange ("CSE") is the smallest of
the currently registered fully regulated national securities exchanges in terms of
shares and transactions.
Id. at 8380. "For calendar year 1990, CSE's average daily volume, expressed in
reported trades was 717; its average daily volume, expressed in shares traded was
1,238,241." Id. at 8380 n.40.
170. Id. at 8382-83.
171. Such a rule is to be distinguished from SEC proposed rule 15c2-10. Reg.
§ 240.15(2-10), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,115 (proposed Apr. 11, 1989). Rule 15c2-10
"is designed to provide for SEC review of proprietary trading systems that are not
operated as facilities of a registered national securities exchange or association and are
not subject to SEC regulation as national securities exchanges or associations pursuant
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of scale surrounding the exchange of stock,172 it is likely that
certain of these exchanges will prevail in the competitive
marketplace. As these stock exchanges become more successful,
they will come under the SEC's regulatory framework.
Eventually, we may even end up with one dominant stock
exchange, similar to what we have currently. 173 The difference
is that it would be a stock exchange whose structure is the most
efficient of a large group of contenders, rather than the heir to
the legacy of an idea that is over two centuries old.
The process as described should be molded by the SEC to
meet the goals of section 11A. For example, the SEC should
only exempt those stock exchanges which operate over an
automated network, as opposed to exchange floors. It is
unlikely that anyone would build a new exchange floor, but
such a limitation would serve a useful signalling purpose. The
SEC should also exempt only those stock exchanges which
engage in independent price discovery. 174  No system which
relies on the NYSE for its prices can ever replace the NYSE
itself. A word of caution: the SEC could select any number of
desirable attributes of an automated stock exchange and limit
exemptions to those exchanges possessing such attributes. This
approach, however, would be contrary to the general goal of
allowing the market to determine the most efficient design of a
stock exchange. Any limitations of this sort should be based on
sound fundamental regulatory requirements and be balanced
wisely against their restraint on innovation.
This Note proposes that the following rule should be
promulgated by the SEC:
17 C.F.R. 240.5a Exemptions from Registration.
(a) Applications for exemption made pursuant to rule
240.6a-1 shall be approved if the following conditions
are met:
to Sections 6 or 15A of the' Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Proprietary Trading
Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 26,708, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,406, at 80,053 (Apr. 11, 1989). The difference between this Note's proposed
rule 5a and proposed rule 15c2-10 is fundamental. This Note argues for exempting
entities from regulation, which under current law would be regulated. Rule 15c2-10
proposes regulating entities which are not currently subject to regulation as exchanges.
172. See Oesterle et al., supra note 58, at 295-300.
173. Cf id. at 296-97 (discussing the NYSE and its specialists as having occupied,
in the past, a near natural monopoly position in the market).
174. See Request for Comment on U.S. Equity Market Structure Study, Exchange
Act Release No. 30,920, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,012, at
82,914-15 nn.36-38 (July 14, 1992).
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(1) The entity seeking exemption is registered
with the SEC as a broker/dealer under 15
U.S.C. 78o(a)(1);
(2) The entity seeking exemption uses an
automated network as its principal vehicle
for the exchange of securities. No exemption
shall be granted under this rule for entities
intending to operate a centralized trading
floor;
(3) The entity seeking exemption uses an
autonomous mechanism for discovering
prices. No exemption shall be granted under
this rule for entities intending to trade
securities at prices discovered on a
registered securities exchange, a registered
self-regulatory organization, or any foreign
exchange; 175 and
(4) The entity seeking exemption files an
affidavit of intent to operate at an annual
volume of less than 450 million shares or at
an annual dollar value of less than $150
billion as adjusted for inflation from the date
of promulgation of this rule.
1 76
(b) Entities granted exemptions under paragraph (a) of
this rule shall file annually with the SEC data
showing that the limitations contained in
subparagraphs (1)-(4) were met during the previous
year.
(c) Entities granted exemption under paragraph (a) of
this rule shall have the authority to trade any
securities registered with the SEC and listed on any
national securities exchange or self-regulatory
organization.
The SEC should also solicit proposals for conducting a major
study to design a system. The SEC should fund this study and
175. Of course, securities will trade on any new exchange at the same prices
available on the existing exchanges. If prices were different, arbitrage would occur,
forcing prices back into parity. For a discussion of arbitrage, see supra notes 42-45 and
accompanying text. The intent of this requirement is to ensure that potential
competitors to the NYSE have the ability to compete over the long term. Thus, there
must be an endogenous price discovery mechanism, as exists on the Wunsch system.
For a discussion of the Wunsch price discovery mechanism, see supra note 130 and
accompanying text.
176. These figures represent approximately 9% of the 1992 volume on the NYSE.
FACT BOOK 1992, supra note 2, at 11.
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then make its conclusions available to the public.'77 Currently,
a market participant would face a great deal of risk in
designing such a system. A funded study would take some of
the risk out of the system design process for any future market
entrants.
The unfortunate dilemma the SEC faces in encouraging the
development of a national market system is that while a purely
market based solution is optimal, the current structure of the
market makes the independent, undirected adoption of such a
system unlikely. The SEC's Equity Market 2000 study will
examine these issues and hopefully come to some definite
conclusions about the scope of the SEC's role in shaping the
markets of the future:
There have been widespread differences of opinion over the
role the Commission has played over the past 17 years in
oversight of the equity market structure. One viewpoint
would have the Commission exercising more initiative in
the process, while a different viewpoint would lead to less
governmental action to alter, shape, or direct market forces.
Whatever the merits of either view, all those interested in
the development of healthy equity markets-investors,
issuers, the SROs, market professionals, and
Congress-have frequently looked to the Commission to
resolve or mediate the seemingly intractable market issues
that continually arise. Accordingly, the Division [of Market
Regulation] is interested in exploring the proper degree of
Commission oversight of the functioning of U.S. equity
markets. 178
C. Room for Caution
The SEC has been criticized for its handling of Congress'
section 11A mandate. 179 Why has it failed to act? One answer
is that the exchange floor community and other political
177. This is similar to a proposal made by Cohen, supra note 3, at 78-81. Cohen
argues for the creation of a committee to provide design and financing plans and rules
for the national market system to the SEC. This committee would also sponsor studies
concerning the future development of the national market system. Id.
178. Request for Comment on U.S. Equity Market Structure Study, Exchange Act
Release No. 30,920, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,012, at 82,909
(July 14, 1992).
179. See, e.g., Macey & Haddock, supra note 152, at 322-24.
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constituencies which have a vested interest in the status quo
are simply too powerful. While in the final analysis, this is
probably the reason why wholesale reform has failed,"'0 even
interests as powerful as these must advance legitimate reasons
to maintain the status quo other than to maintain their power
base.
A shibboleth which the NYSE has invoked repeatedly in
opposing various market reforms is market "fragmentation."'8'
Fragmentation, so the argument goes, would reduce the "depth"
of the market, and lead to disorderliness and discontinuity of
pricing. 182  Admittedly, there are benefits inherent in
centralizing trading.' Critics of this argument, however, claim
that fragmentation is merely a dirty word for competition.' 84 It
is ironic indeed that the NYSE, the last bastion of unabashed
capitalism, should claim relief from "ruinous competition." The
answer to their claim is simple: if fragmentation were injurious
to investors, it would not happen. Investors are risk averse.
They will not leave the safe portals of the NYSE unless there
is truly something better available. But, investors are leav-
ing... and despite the efforts of the NYSE, U.S. securities
180. Former NYSE Chairman John Phelan, Jr. perhaps put it best: "Technology
and communication bring efficiency. Money is made in inefficiency." Hansell, supra
note 17, at 172.
181. See, e.g., NYSE, COMMENTS ON THE NEED FOR AN ORDER ExPosURE RULE
(1982).
182. See generally WILLIAM M. MARTIN, JR., THE SECURITIES MARKETS: A REPORT,
WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (1971) [hereinafter MARTIN REPORT].
183. Professor Seligman describes these benefits thusly:
With a regular volume of orders flowing to a single place of execution, a central
market should be "orderly," without wide or abrupt price swings; "continuous,"
with minimum price variations between successive transactions; "liquid," with the
ability to process orders immediately and have "depth" or the capacity to handle
temporary imbalances in supply and demand caused by substantial volume
without becoming disorderly.
Seligman, supra note 39, at 84; see also MARTIN REPORT, supra note 182, at 2.
184. Interview with Joel Seligman, Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law
School, in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Oct. 14, 1992). "Banning proprietary exchanges which
directly serve customers would have that effect [granting the NYSE a monopoly], which
is of course exactly the intent of the intensive lobbying which claims that fragmentation
(read 'competition') is bad for markets (read 'members')." Steven Wunsch, Market
Fragmentation: Threat to U.S. Competitiveness or the Cartel's Clever Ruse, WALL
STREET LETTER, June 29, 1992, at S2.
185. The persistence of "third market" trading in the period since brokerage
commission rates were deregulated refutes the view offered by Professor Poser in 1981
that such deregulation would enable the NYSE to regain institutional trading volume,
and thus remain the de facto national market system. See Poser, supra note 89, at 903.
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markets are becoming increasingly fragmented." 6
There is at least one concern about changing the market
environment, however, (other than the purely political) which
is legitimate.'87 In this case, as in many, a legitimate rationale
for proceeding cautiously is risk.' SEC Chairman Williams
persuasively expressed his view before Congress in 1980,
stating, "I am not about to be the person to come back to
Congress and say I am sorry I implemented your program and
it blew [up]. [Tihe capital markets of this country are too
important."8 9 The fact is that we have a system that works,
and the conventional wisdom in such a situation is that "if it
ain't broke, don't fix it." 90 Such an attitude, while prudent,
may be somewhat short-sighted. The system "ain't broke" only
so long as there is no better system available. One may have
said there was nothing "broke" with the U.S. auto
industry-until the Japanese began overwhelming it in
international competition.' 9 ' In high technology, the balancing
186. "In 1981, the NYSE had more than 86 percent of the volume on the
Consolidated Tape in NYSE listed stocks; in 1991, it had approximately 67 percent."
Karmel, supra note 12, at 4.
187. Although perhaps this assumes that political issues are inherently
"illegitimate."
188. See generally David M. Schizer, Note, Benign Restraint: The SEC's Regulation
of Execution Systems, 101 YALE L.J. 1551 (1992) (arguing that the SEC is correct in
adopting a restrained regulatory strategy). One of the most significant risks involved
with automating the markets is that the speed at which transactions are completed
may cause unforeseen problems, including increased volatility. Interview with John F.
O'Donovan, supra note 58. Indeed, the Paris Bourse has encountered exactly that sort
of volatility on their automated network, although they ascribe it to a lack of liquidity
due to investors' reluctance to place large orders on the system. Hansell, supra note
17, at 183; see also MARKETING MECHANISMS REPORT, supra note 47, at VI-52 (noting
that trading procedures aimed at easing NASD members' apprehension about
automation exacerbated the 1987 October market break).
189. STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH
CONG., 2D SESS., NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM: 5 YEAR STATUS REPORT 2 (Comm. Print
1980) [hereinafter STATUS REPORT].
190. This phrase is originally attributed to Bert Lance, Chairman of the Office of
Management and Budget under President Carter. William Safire, Wedges and Bounces,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1992, § 6 (Magazine), at 24.
191. Indeed, if market share in the futures trading market is any indication of
things to come for the equity trading market, time is even more clearly of the essence:
[I]n striking contrast to the years prior to 1982, market share is moving away
from U.S. shores, toward Europe and the Pacific Basin. As recently as 1986, U.S.
exchanges commanded 99 percent of market share in stock-index futures, with the
Standard & Poor's 500 index (CME), at 19.5 million contracts traded, accounting
for approximately three fourths of the total. Just three years later, at the close
of 1989, U.S. market share had slipped to 57 percent. The S&P 500 did finish
1989 as the industry's pacesetter, but volume, at 10.5 million, was down some 46
percent from 1986.
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act is to stay on the "leading edge" where you can compete
effectively, and stay off the "bleeding edge" where you take on
too much risk. Is there too much risk in automating the
securities markets? That depends on how clever you think the
competition is. It may be a mistake to underestimate the
financial communities in London and Tokyo-or even
Toronto.
192
The transition from the physical stock exchanges to an
automated network entails a great deal of risk. Such is the
nature of transition. Those who manage change effectively can
benefit from it. Those who resist change are likely to be left
behind. Given the increasing globalization of the securities
markets, the NYSE, like U.S. Steel,'93 is no longer guaranteed
a monopoly over the market. The question for the 1990s and
beyond will not be who had the first major stock exchange, or
even who had the best stock exchange. The question will be
William J. Brodsky, The Future Is Now, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Jan. 1991, at Supp.
7.
192. For example, the London Stock Exchange's SEAQ system may present future
challenges to U.S. dominance of stock exchanges. See supra text accompanying note
115. For an explanation of the market structure debates ongoing in Europe, see
Roberta S. Karmel, The Stalled Investment Services Directive, N.Y. L.J., June 18, 1992,
at 3. A group in London is also planning to start an electronic trading system which
would offer institutional investors low-cost secondary trading. Let's Do Wunsch;
Electronic European Exchange in the Works, WALL STREET LErrER, July 13, 1992, at
1. The Toronto Stock Exchange is preparing to close its trading floor by the end of
1993, saving $30 million over six years. Farnsworth, supra note 70, at 15. "Could the
NYSE floor become a museum devoted to vintage technology while Vancouver licenses
its trading system to emerging markets in Latin America, and Toronto sells
Computer-Assisted Trading System (CATS) to the Europeans? At home, the Big Board
is losing market share to fledgling crossing networks and to institutional investors like
Fidelity that cross orders internally." Ivy Schmerken, Wall Street's Quiet Revolution,
WALL ST. & TECH., June 1992, at 26. There is clearly no dearth of pretenders to the
NYSE's throne.
193. See generally ROBERT W. CRANDALL, THE U.S. STEEL INDUSTRY IN RECURENT
CRISIS (1981) (arguing that global diffusion ofsteelmaking technology helped contribute
to the U.S. steel industry's decline). The Commerce Department explains that:
The declining competitiveness of domestic steel may be attributed to a number
of interrelated factors. One central factor is that the domestic steel industry has
been slower in adopting cost saving technologies ....
[A] nother factor ... is the relatively high cost of labor in the U.S. market ....
The domestic steel industry's future will depend on its flexibility... and on its
adaptability to the changing world market.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE U.S. PRIMARY IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY SINCE 1958,
at 27 (1985).
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who has the best stock exchange system."9 It is the role of the
SEC to regulate and promote the exchange of securities within
the United States. The U.S. financial markets are considered
to be a "national asset."195 Now is not too soon for the SEC to
take action to ensure the continuation of the United States as
a world financial center.
CONCLUSION
Progress, therefore, is not an accident,
but a necessity .... It is a part of nature.'96
The establishment of a national automated securities
exchange system, unlike most technological advances, is not
inevitable. 97 The entrenched interests in control of the current
system are unlikely to support the elimination of their
privileged position. 9 ' It is in the nature of free markets that
market power can become concentrated, and thus inhibit the
further development of the market itself.'99  When that
happens, government authority becomes necessary to correct
the "market failure." This is the theory behind government
regulation of natural monopolies, government intervention in
the form of antitrust regulation, and indeed, government
regulation in the securities markets at all.
The question facing the SEC on this issue is simply this:
what market is it to protect? If the SEC views its role as
194. "At stake from the New York Stock Exchange's point of view is its preeminent
position as the principal market for securities of major corporations (indeed, the world's
largest capital market)." Farrar, supra note 10, at 109. See generally STATUS REPORT,
supra note 189 (discussing the status of the national market system five years after its
inception).
195. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(A) (1988).
196. Herbert Spencer, quoted in OXFORD DICTIONARY. OF QUOTATIONS 514 (3d ed.
1979).
197. Demise of Trading Pits Not Inevitable-Officials, REUTERS NEWS REP., Jan. 30,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
198. See generally Farrar, supra note 10 (noting how vested interests can resist
structural reforms on Wall Street).
199. This clearly has happened in the case of the NYSE. "Had Rip Van Winkle, a
stockbroker, fallen asleep at the corner of Wall and Broad streets in 1870 and awakened
a century later, he would have found both the structure and technology of the
marketplace with which he had been familiar essentially intact." Farrar, supra note
10, at 117.
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correcting market failure in the current system, without
analyzing the system itself, then the prescription should be
business as usual. If the proper role of the SEC, however, is to
develop and encourage the exchange of securities, as opposed to
the securities exchanges, encouraging the development of a
national automated securities exchange system deserves a hard
look. True, the establishment of such a system is not
inevitable."' ° But given international competition, the United
States' continued preeminence as a financial center is not
inevitable either.0 1
200. William C. Freund, chief economist emeritus of NYSE and professor and
chairman of the economics department at Pace University's Graduate School of
Business, takes a contrary view. He claims that a global automated trading network
is both inevitable and desirable. William Freund, Trading Equities, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Jan. 1991, at Supp. 21-22..
201. See generally Macey & Kanda, supra note 98 (arguing that the regulatory
structure of the Tokyo Stock Exchange is better suited to modern trading practices and
investor needs than the structure of the NYSE); Solomon & Dicker, supra note 20, at
249-51 (noting that the globalization of financial markets has increased the pressure
on U.S. markets to compete for capital). The British appear to have learned this lesson
already. "We have no God-given right to be a central market in equities.'" Steven
Prokesch, Market Place: London is Trying to Keep Its Lead, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1990,
at D6 (quoting Nigel Elwes, Warburg Securities executive).
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